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On the Categorical Approach to 
Free Speech – And the Protracted 
Failure to Delimit the True 
Threats Exception to the First 
Amendment 
 
Dr. Wayne Batchis 
 
Introduction 
 
On June 1, 2015, the Supreme Court decided Elonis v. 
United States on statutory rather than constitutional grounds.1  
In doing so, it turned away an important opportunity to provide 
needed clarification of true threats, a category of expression 
relegated to a lower level of protection by the Court almost a 
half-century ago.2  The categorical approach to free speech 
made its first explicit appearance in Supreme Court case law in 
1942.3  Since that time, the Court has relied heavily on this 
method of constitutional interpretation, carving out discrete 
exceptions from the seemingly absolutist mandate of the First 
Amendment that Congress make no law abridging the freedom 
of speech.4  Although the categorical approach – frequently 
front and center in First Amendment adjudication – has been 
with us for almost seventy-five years, it rests on a surprisingly 
unsettled theoretical foundation.  It is an indispensable 
doctrinal tool with a puzzling and sometimes contradictory 
array of justifications and operating instructions.  In this piece, 
I attempt to clear up the confusion.  I examine the evolution of 
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1.  Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015). 
2.  See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969). 
3.  See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
4.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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this approach to the First Amendment.  I critically assess the 
famous dictum from Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire that is 
responsible for establishing this system of classification.  I 
scrutinize a number of possible interpretations of Chaplinsky 
and explore the disparate scholarly and judicial perspectives on 
this mode of constitutional interpretation.  Finally, I move from 
the foundations and justifications of the categorical approach to 
the way this system works in practice.  I argue that if the 
Court is to maintain its fidelity to an effectual categorical 
system of First Amendment adjudication – one that is properly 
respectful of the high stakes for free expression and democratic 
self-governance – it is vitally important that Court adequately 
define and operationalize respective categories.  The final third 
of this article delves into one such category: true threats.  I 
closely examine the Court’s true threats jurisprudence and look 
critically at the recent Elonis decision, contrasting the Court’s 
protracted failure to define and delimit true threats with the 
comparatively robust guidance it has offered with other 
discrete categories. 
Content-based discrimination has long been understood as 
one of the most troublesome forms of speech suppression.  
Unlike mere restrictions on how or where views may be 
expressed, targeting particular ideas because of their substance 
and penalizing or prohibiting them evokes draconian images of 
political oppression by tyrants, Orwellian mind control, and 
raw censorship.  Yet, although the First Amendment is written 
in absolutist language, it has never been understood to offer 
absolute protection.  There has, quite simply, always been a 
wide array of expression – from fraud to slander, from child 
pornography to coercive threats – that overwhelming 
majorities feel is intolerable and inconsistent with an ordered 
civil society.  The Supreme Court has settled upon a range of 
doctrinal approaches to free speech that seek to both 
accommodate this reality, yet pay proper heed to a 
fundamental constitutional right. 
One dominant methodology, utilized in most cases where 
expression is regulated based upon its content, is referred to as 
the categorical approach.  In some respects, it would seem to 
offer the best of all worlds: it allows for a default rule that – 
consistent with the unequivocal language of the First 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/1
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Amendment itself – affords virtually absolute protection 
against content based suppression, yet at the same time 
permits discrete exceptions to be carved out when the 
abridgement applies to certain narrow types of ostensibly “low 
value” or especially harmful speech.5  While the categorical 
approach certainly has its critics, many free speech advocates 
applaud this method because it seems to minimize the risk of 
ad hoc balancing, a case-by-case approach that makes all 
speech susceptible to suppression if, in toto, a judge happens to 
determine that the circumstances weigh on the speech-
restrictive side of the scale.6 
A categorical approach, however, is only as good as the 
categories that comprise it.  Indeed, a categorical system with 
insufficiently defined categories may ultimately backfire.  It 
may be less protective than a wholesale balancing system.  At 
the same time, it may provide the misleading appearance of a 
Court willing to place constraints on its own authority in the 
interest of principled First Amendment jurisprudence.  On its 
face, a categorical structure establishes a consistent rule-based 
methodology that constrains courts, promoting – if not 
ensuring – disciplined predictability in free speech 
jurisprudence; but when the Supreme Court holds tight to its 
most important card – the definition and doctrinal mechanics 
of the category itself – it does the very opposite.  It invites 
courts and legislatures to construe an entire category of 
expression as broadly or idiosyncratically as it likes.  Until a 
higher court intervenes (or in the case of legislatures, any court 
with jurisdiction), the default is a far-reaching and malleable 
lack of First Amendment protection.  Today, with the rapidly 
expanding landscape of electronic idea conveyance, quelling 
free speech uncertainty and insecurity is arguably more vitally 
important than ever.  Yet, in the 2015 decision of Elonis v. 
United States, a Court notable for its highly speech-protective 
jurisprudence willfully rejected one of its most high-profile and 
potentially impactful opportunities to do just this.7  Even more 
troubling, it did so with regard to a highly consequential 
 
5.  GEOFFREY R. STONE et al., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1134 (7th ed. 2013). 
6.  See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT 54-55 (1966). 
7.  See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015). 
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category of speech – true threats – a category in which it has 
offered virtually no guidance since it was first formally 
identified by the Court almost half a century ago. 
 
Why not Absolutism? 
 
The most obvious answer to the question “why not 
absolutism?” is that expression is ubiquitous.  Words can 
defraud, extort, coerce, destroy reputations, and threaten lives.  
An absolutist view of the First Amendment, in light of the 
ubiquity of speech in human life, would inject what is quite 
simply an unacceptable degree of lawlessness into the social 
world.  It would mean the end of contract law, for there could 
be no adverse legal repercussions for not adhering to 
contractual terms spoken or written.  The words: “your money 
or your life” would be protected speech.  A Neo-Nazi leader 
could command a follower to “pull the trigger” of a gun pressed 
firmly against the cheek of an African American – and suffer 
no consequences.  An angry colleague could, without any fear of 
adverse legal consequence, fabricate accusations of pedophilia 
and proceed to destroy the career of his targeted victim by 
spreading word of these falsely manufactured proclivities. 
In short, it is virtually impossible to envision a regime of 
truly absolute free speech.  There are many examples, like the 
hypotheticals above, all of which arguably turn on common 
sense – circumstances in which most would agree that a First 
Amendment exception is called for.  Of course, these are the 
easy cases.  This leads us to two further complications.  First, 
not all cases are this easy.  One person’s common sense 
exception might be another’s outrageous incursion into 
individual freedom.  Second, whether addressing a purportedly 
“easy” case or a more “difficult” one, how are courts to manage 
this dilemma?  Courts are confronted with what seems to be an 
unenviable requirement that they selectively diverge from a 
straight-forward reading of constitutional language.  How is 
this to be done? 
One’s first impulse might be to suggest that courts treat 
freedom of speech like any other public policy goal.  On one 
hand, we value free speech; on the other, we value other social 
goods such as enforceable contracts, public safety, and 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/1
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compensation for those wrongfully harmed.  Confronted with 
circumstances in which free speech conflicts with another 
important social value, a court could simply balance the 
interests at stake and arrive at the outcome that best fits the 
unique set of facts, circumstances, and interests of the case at 
hand.  This is the job of courts after all: to make judgments. 
Yet, something about this approach might not sit well.  
Courts would be tasked with a role virtually indistinguishable 
from that of their legislative peers: simply weighing the policy 
interests at stake and choosing the more “socially good” or least 
“socially harmful” option.  Courts would, in this respect, behave 
just like legislators, drawing upon their personal philosophy, 
accumulated wisdom, and evidence presented, to arrive at a 
policy conclusion they think optimal: uninhibited free 
expression on one side of the scale and counter-veiling interests 
on the other.  Such an approach might be said to blur the 
important distinction between the legislative and judicial 
roles.8  The great First Amendment scholar and consummate 
critic of ad hoc balancing, Thomas Emerson, lamented that as a 
doctrinal test, ad hoc balancing “frames the issues in such a 
broad and undefined way, [and] is in effect so unstructured, 
that it can hardly be described as a rule of law at all.”9  Even 
more damning, to Emerson, ad hoc balancing “gives no real 
meaning to the [F]irst [A]mendment . . . [I]t amounts to no 
more than a statement that the legislature may restrict 
expression whenever it finds it reasonable to do so, and that 
the courts will not restrain the legislature unless that 
judgment is itself unreasonable.”10 
Furthermore, such balancing might suggest that all policy 
interests – including those rooted in the Constitution – are on 
the same plane, but they are not.  Article VI of the Constitution 
declares that the Constitution “shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land.”11  More than two centuries ago, Chief Justice Marshall 
scoffed at the notion that ordinary legislation and the 
Constitution should be treated as equals, emphatically 
describing as “a proposition too plain to be contested, that the 
 
8.  EMERSON, supra note 6, at 55.  
9.  Id. at 54. 
10. Id. at 55. 
11.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it.”12  To 
Justice Chief Marshall, the implications of adopting an 
alternative construction would be dire and dispiriting: “then 
written constitutions [would be no more than] absurd attempts, 
on the part of the people, to limit a power, in its own nature 
illimitable.”13  What was intended by the framers to be a rigid 
constraint on government power – circumscribing its role by 
identifying particular values that were not to be breached – 
would instead become just one more policy consideration to be 
thrown into the mix by both the legislature and judiciary alike.  
The very fact that the framers chose to include free speech as a 
fundamental guarantee in the Constitution arguably precludes 
this approach.  The balance has already been stricken.  As 
Justice Black has observed, “a governmental policy of 
unfettered communication of ideas does entail dangers.  To the 
Founders of this Nation, however, the benefits derived from 
free expression were worth the risk.  They embodied this 
philosophy in the First Amendment’s command . . . .”14 
A proponent of balancing might retort that balancing need 
not suggest that all interests be accorded equal weight.  A 
preponderance of the evidence in favor of curtailing free speech 
– need not be sufficient.  In other words, one way to ensure that 
constitutional provisions like the First Amendment are not 
reduced to the status of ordinary law – merely by virtue of 
accepting that they cannot be understood to be “absolute” – is 
to set the bar for overriding that constitutional interest very 
high.  A range of balancing tests are commonly employed 
throughout constitutional law, whether or not the Court 
characterizes its analysis as such.  Its approach has not been 
monolithic.  The Court has utilized a variety of standards 
establishing the requisite interest needed to override a 
constitutional right.  It was the assumption that an easy-to-
pass rationality standard would guide ad hoc balancing – with 
the natural corollary of a deferential judiciary gladly willing to 
accept a legislative determination that free speech may be 
abridged – that motivated much of Emerson’s ire against this 
 
12.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
13.  Id. 
14.  Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 580 (1951). 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/1
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doctrinal approach.15  However, other balancing standards 
might require much more: a “compelling interest” may be 
demanded to outweigh free speech.16  Other circumstances may 
call for an intermediate analysis, where an “important 
objective” is required – more than a merely rational interest, 
but less than a compelling one.17 
This framework is, of course, familiar to anyone with a 
rudimentary understanding of Constitutional Law, and is 
perhaps most commonly associated with the Court’s Equal 
Protection jurisprudence.  These tiers of review are also no 
stranger to the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.  In 
some First Amendment settings, the Supreme Court has 
adopted this mode of analysis, and one might conclude that this 
is our answer to our dilemma.  To accommodate the problem of 
a First Amendment that simply cannot be absolute – as the 
most ardent free speech advocate may, in theory, wish it could 
be – we handicap one side of the scale, and we ratchet-up what 
it required to outweigh free expression. 
 
The Early Years 
 
We might, in fact, characterize the first fifty years of 
significant First Amendment jurisprudence by the Supreme 
Court, beginning in the early part of the 20th century, as a 
progression of this sort of balance-centric thinking.  The 
earliest First Amendment cases utilized the language of 
balancing.  Although in 1919 Justice Holmes introduced what 
might, on-its-face, have looked like a black-or-white 
dichotomous rule (the “clear and present danger” test), a 
cursory read of Schenck v. United States reveals a methodology 
that is much more sliding-scale than on-off switch.18  A clear 
and present danger allowing for speech suppression was not to 
 
15.  EMERSON, supra note 6, at 55.  
16.  See Brown v. Entm't Merc. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011)  
(“Because the Act imposes a restriction on the content of protected speech, it 
is invalid unless California can demonstrate that it passes strict scrutiny—
that is, unless it is justified by a compelling government interest and is 
narrowly drawn to serve that interest.”) 
17.  See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551-2556 (2012) 
(Breyer, S., concurring). 
18.  Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
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be established by a crystal clear rule that could be applied with 
uniformity, predictability, and certainty in any setting.  
Rather, in Justice Holmes’ own words, determining whether 
the standard has been met was “a question of proximity and 
degree.”19  It is, in short, a balance. 
Justice Holmes explained that the First Amendment, quite 
simply, could not reasonably be understood to be absolute, by 
way of the metaphor that would become the universal 
shorthand for this most intractable quandary: “The most 
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in 
falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”20  The 
Court’s early free speech jurisprudence struggled mightily to 
identify an appropriate test for managing the stubborn First 
Amendment problem of an absolute right that could not be 
absolute.  It had a number of options.  The Court could have 
just thrown up its hands and said “we’re not touching this 
issue.”  For much of the Court’s history, it effectively did just 
this – not unlike the way it had done in 1849 with another 
discrete provision in the Constitution: the guarantee of a 
republican form of government in Art. IV, §4.21 
But with the turn of the 20th century, the Court began to 
confront the First Amendment dilemma head on.  It would not 
take long for Justice Holmes, after considerable trial and error, 
to come to the realization that a highly malleable balancing 
test was not the optimal solution.  In his famous dissent in 
Abrams v. United States, he implored the Court to adopt a 
much more rigorous test – one that was fixed and precise.22  
Justice Holmes proclaimed that even in the context of war, “the 
principle of the right to free speech is always the same.”23  
What he proposed now looked completely unlike the balancing 
he had utilized in Schenck earlier in that very same year.24  
Justice Holmes made it clear that suppression should only be 
permitted where there was a “present danger of immediate evil 
 
19.  Id. at 52. 
20.  Id. 
21.  See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849). 
22.  Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
23.  Id. at 628. 
24.  See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 47.  
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/1
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or an intent to bring it about . . . .”25  This was no flexible 
balancing standard.  It was a rule: one either passed or failed. 
Over time, variations of the Holmes formulation – forged 
in multiple dissents alongside Louis Brandeis – would gain 
currency on the Court.  However, it would take time for the 
test’s precise form to solidify; as a standard, the clear and 
present danger test would remain in flux for many decades.  
Justice Jackson quipped: “All agree that it means something 
very important, but no two seem to agree on what it is.”26  Long 
after the departure of Justices Holmes and Brandeis, the Court 
would continue to speak out both sides of its mouth, at once 
utilizing the firm and unbending “clear and present danger” 
language of the preeminent justices, but in application 
imposing it as a malleable balancing test.  Dennis v. United 
States, a 1951 red-scare era decision, is perhaps the most 
notable example of how the Court straddled this line.27 
In this deeply conflicted – and today, widely condemned 
and discredited – decision, the Court moved in concert with a 
country consumed by “Cold War hysteria” that was believed by 
many to have “infected the judges’ reasoning.”28  A plurality of 
the Court, utilizing an unabashedly balance-based variant of 
the clear and present danger Test, allowed for the conviction of 
the major leaders of the Communist Party USA while explicitly 
citing the Court’s movement over time toward a “Holmes-
Brandeis rationale.”29  The defendants’ crime was neither 
attempting to nor advocating to overthrow the government, but 
rather, merely conspiring to advocate such overthrow by 
organizing the teaching of Marxist-Leninist doctrine.30  Under 
the plurality’s rationale, the clear and present danger 
requirement was to be applied as a balancing test that 
considered not merely the existence or non-existence of 
imminent danger – what Justice Douglas in dissent would have 
limited to circumstances in which “conditions are so critical 
 
25.  Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628.   
26.  Dennis, 341 U.S. at 567 n.9.  
27.  Id. at 494. 
28.  Christina E. Wells, Fear and Loathing in Constitutional Decision-
Making, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 115, 118-19 (2005).  
29.  Dennis, 341 U.S. at 507-08. 
30.  Id. at 582 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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that there will be no time to avoid the evil that the speech 
threatens”31 – but also the “gravity” of the evil presented.  As 
with any flexible balancing test with multiple variables, 
increased severity in one area may mean that a lower threshold 
will suffice in another.  Because the gravity of the potential 
harm was deemed so great – violent overthrow of the 
government – the fact that the harm was improbable (and 
certainly not imminent) was not an obstacle to conviction.32 
In retrospect, there is no question that this approach to the 
First Amendment is viewed by most scholars, historians, and 
jurists as most regrettable.  Even at the time of the Dennis 
decision, there was deep disagreement on the Court; it split 
into multiple opinions, and only four of the justices agreed on 
the use of the particular clear and present danger balancing 
test formulation that led to the Communists’ loss.33  Justice 
Frankfurter derided the Court’s previous – more categorically-
bound – use of the test, while conceding that reinterpreting the 
test’s meaning such that “‘clear’ and ‘present’ [now] mean[s] an 
entertainable ‘probability’” was, in light of the Court’s 
precedent, simply inconsistent.34  In contrast, Justice Jackson, 
while also arguing that the clear and present danger test 
should not apply in this situation, was fully comfortable with 
the test’s prior use under alternate circumstances.35  It would 
seem that to Justice Jackson, the Communist threat of the 
1950s was different in kind from the “trivialities that were 
being prosecuted” in the earlier part of the century when the 
test first emerged.36  “Unless we are to hold our Government 
captive in a judge-made verbal trap, we must approach the 
problem of a well-organized, nation-wide conspiracy . . . 
realistically . . . .”37 
What is Justice Jackson saying here? A “judge-made verbal 
trap” is simply a pejorative description of a categorical rule-
based approach, one that takes discretion from the legislature 
 
31.  Id. at 585. 
32.  Id. at 509. 
33.  See Dennis, 341 U.S. 494. 
34.  Id. at 527 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
35.  Id. at 567-68 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
36.  Id. at 569. 
37.  Id. at 568-69. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/1
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by imposing “either/or” rigidity rather than the fluidity of 
balancing.  While such a methodology may be appropriate in 
some contexts, to Justice Jackson, this was not one of them.  
Whether it was conceived of as part of the clear and present 
danger test, or independent of it, balancing had won the day.  
However, other impulses were brewing on the Supreme Court.  
Indeed, less than a decade earlier, in what is perhaps some of 
the most influential Court dicta in First Amendment 
jurisprudential history, the Court had laid out a framework for 
an entirely different approach. 
 
The Rise of the Categorical Approach 
 
There can be no question that seeking to generalize the 
Supreme Court’s evolving doctrinal rules or standards can be a 
risky endeavor.  The Court is a moving target – nine moving 
targets to be precise.  The justices frequently disagree on the 
appropriate method of resolving constitutional dilemmas.  
Time, context, and social change can sometimes justify a 
shifting doctrinal focus, and the Court’s membership itself 
changes – and with it the judicial philosophy of the individual 
justices.  We are often left with the impression that while there 
may be a dominant doctrinal structure, its boundaries and 
justifications are disconcertingly blurry.  Such is the case with 
the categorical approach to content-based speech abridgement. 
The famous dictum in the 1942 case of Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, more than any other decision, helped solidify the 
Court’s move toward a categorical structure and away from 
balancing.38  Chaplinsky, unlike many of the Supreme Court’s 
high-profile First Amendment decisions, addressed nothing as 
heady as a proposed violent overthrow of the government.  
Instead, the case revolved around a seemingly mundane topic: 
the spontaneous exchange of angry and aggressive words – 
akin to what one might imagine would precede a barroom 
brawl.39  What was critical to the decision was the Court’s 
broader-than-necessary assessment of how such so-called 
“fighting words,” along with other discrete types of speech, 
 
38.  See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
39.  Id.  
11
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were to be treated for First Amendment purposes.  This dictum 
bears repeating: 
 
[I]t is well understood that the right of free 
speech is not absolute at all times and under all 
circumstances. There are certain well-defined 
and narrowly limited classes of speech, the 
prevention and punishment of which have never 
been thought to raise any Constitutional 
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the 
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 
“fighting” words – those which by their very 
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an 
immediate breach of the peace. It has been well 
observed that such utterances are no essential 
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such 
slight social value as a step to truth that any 
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly 
outweighed by the social interest in order and 
morality.40 
 
This much-cited language clearly stood for the baseline 
proposition that content-based limitations on speech were to be 
approached categorically rather than through ad hoc balancing.  
As mentioned previously, for many advocates of a vigorously 
speech-protective First Amendment, this is a preferred 
approach.  Yet, the dictum itself was subject to harsh criticism 
from many First Amendment scholars.41  Although it has 
endured as precedent establishing this two-tiered method of 
First Amendment interpretation and as a statement of how 
and why this doctrinal approach should operate in practice, it 
was deeply flawed.  First, the notion that punishing or 
prohibiting the enumerated categorically-excepted classes of 
speech does not “raise any Constitutional problem”42 has never 
been widely, and certainly not uniformly, accepted.  From 
 
40.  Id. at 571-72. 
41.  See Ronald K.L. Collins, Exceptional Freedom – The Roberts Court, 
The First Amendment, and the New Absolutism, 76 ALB. L. REV. 409, 414-15 
(2013).  
42.  Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (emphasis added). 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/1
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fighting words43 to libel44 to obscenity45 – while entitled to a 
lower level of constitutional scrutiny – the Court has 
repeatedly concluded that some constitutional protection still 
applies.  Excepted categories are not invisible to the 
Constitution, as the Chaplinsky dictum implies.  Second, and 
perhaps most glaring, is the fact that 40 percent (or two of the 
five) of the illustrative categories causally laid out as examples 
of unprotected speech are largely protected.46  Chaplinsky also 
did not profess to provide an exhaustive list of those categories 
– leaving many questions for the future.  This leads to the third 
weakness of the Chaplinsky dictum: on what bases are the 
excepted categories to be chosen?  Here, Justice Murphy, who 
authored Chaplinsky, provides some guidance.  But that 
guidance is arguably confusing and flawed.  Most troubling, to 
many scholars the dictum emphasized the wrong criteria for 
determining what categories should fall outside of the First 
Amendment’s full protection.47 
Chaplinsky conflates two important assertions about how 
the First Amendment should work: first, that narrowly cabined 
categories of speech are not entitled to the full First 
Amendment guarantee (and implicitly that all other speech is 
entitled to full protection) and second, that these categorical 
exclusions are to be defined, at least in part, by virtue of their 
low value as speech.48  Acceptance of the first assertion does 
not necessarily require acceptance of the second.  Yet, this 
conflation has resulted in decades of doctrinal and normative 
confusion from prominent scholars and jurists.  Some ardently 
reject the categorical approach, not because there is something 
inherently objectionable about a two-tiered First Amendment, 
but because these tiers are seen as inextricably linked to the 
premise that the First Amendment allows for judicially 
imposed assessments of the relative value of particular 
 
43.  See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
44.  See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
45.  See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
46.  See, e.g., Sable Comm. of California, Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 131 
(1989) (holding that lewd dial-a-porn services are protected expression); 
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (declaring that profane expression 
is protected speech).  
47.  See infra pp. 21-27. 
48.  See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 568.  
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speech.49  Many scholars see this premise as a perversion of the 
most foundational principle behind the First Amendment, “that 
the government has no business evaluating the content of 
speech.”50  It is anchored in the idea most eloquently 
articulated by Justice Holmes in Abrams that sovereignty of 
“we the people” was not to be governance by a Platonic 
guardian who has a superior ability to divine what ideas have 
value and what ideas do not.51  The widely-accepted “fighting 
faiths” of one era, may be “upset” by time, and become the low-
value speech of another – or vice versa.52  Members of the 
modern Court have, on occasions, explicitly, and in strong 
language, rejected the value-assessment basis for denying First 
Amendment protection to particular speech.53 
There are, however, many potential bases for justifying 
particular categorical exclusions from full First Amendment 
protection.  While the Chaplinsky dictum is widely understood 
to stand for a categorical approach rooted in an assessment of 
particular speech’s relative social value, a close examination of 
the language reveals a much more nuanced set of possibilities. 
First, the language could be read to impose a strictly (or 
predominantly) historic approach to identifying excluded First 
Amendment categories.  Indeed, before Justice Murphy 
pontificates as to why certain categories have been understood 
to be unprotected, he defines these very categories on the basis 
of their historically unprotected status, asserting that 
regulations on these “certain well-defined and narrowly limited 
classes of speech . . . have never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem.”54  In other words, Chaplinsky might 
be understood not as an invitation for the future – to make 
fresh assessments of individual classes of speech and declare 
them unprotected – but as a simple statement of historical fact: 
a certain fixed set of excepted categories exists by virtue of 
their time-tested status.  This approach—focusing on historical 
 
49.  See infra pp. 21-27.  
50.  Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 SMU L. 
REV. 297, 300 (1995). 
51.  Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630. 
52.  Id. 
53.  See, e.g., Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 419 (1988).  
54.  Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (emphasis added). 
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tradition as the criterion to determine whether or not a 
particular categorical exclusion exists – has in fact achieved 
prominence on the Roberts Court.55  Some scholars have 
criticized claims that the particular low-value classes of speech 
articulated in Chaplinsky, and others subsequently added by 
the Court, are truly rooted in history.56  Nonetheless, 
regardless of whether one understands the historical consensus 
on certain speech categories to be largely valid, a strategic 
exaggeration, or a complete myth, one reading of the 
Chaplinsky dictum would seem to endorse this approach.  
Furthermore, there might be strong speech-protective 
instrumental arguments that favor a tradition-based 
justification for the excluded categories that do exist – most 
notably, the relative difficulty of adding new unprotected 
categories under this model. 
A second possible reading of the Chaplinsky dictum might 
emphasize that, prior to addressing the purported nominal 
social value of certain categories of speech, Justice Murphy 
alludes to the harm imposed by such speech.  Recall that in 
summation, at the conclusion of the sentence that lists the five 
illustrative unprotected categories, Justice Murphy 
encapsulates their character as words “which by their very 
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of 
the peace.”57  In the following sentence, Justice Murphy 
highlights the “social interest in order and morality”58 that is 
served by inhibiting such expression.  Thus, another quite 
rational interpretation of Chaplinsky – also consistent with its 
language – would be that the categorical approach is 
fundamentally about carving out narrow exceptions for classes 
of expression that impose intolerable harm.  In other words, 
the key criterion for excluding from full First Amendment 
protection certain categories of speech is the damage caused by 
such expression.  The language alluding to “slight social value” 
 
55.  See Gregory P. Magarian, The Marrow of Tradition: The Roberts 
Court and Categorical First Amendment Speech Exclusions, 56 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1339, 1341 (2015). 
56.  Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. 
REV. 2166, 2168 (2015). 
57.  Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. 
58.  Id. 
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might simply be understood as reflecting the rather straight-
forward belief that if something is sufficiently harmful, its 
potential social value or utility as an “essential part of any 
exposition of ideas” is negated.59 
But let us suppose that one does not accept this 
interpretation – one that would largely reject the independent 
significance of the low-value language in the Chaplinsky 
dictum in favor of one that stresses only the harm principle.  As 
an alternative, one might assert that harm and social-value are 
two independent variables – both of which important under 
Chaplinsky.  In other words, speech may be harmful, but at the 
same time have considerable social value, just as completely 
harmless speech may have the hollow social value of a 
supermarket tabloid.  Admittedly, the dictum could be faulted 
for being somewhat unclear about the relationship between 
these two potentially independent attributes of speech – 
perhaps misleadingly implying that they are necessarily 
linked.  But this ambiguity might be boiled down to poor 
draftsmanship – and this would not be the first time the 
Supreme Court has been accused of such a sin. 
Thus, a third – and also quite palatable – interpretation of 
Chaplinsky might view the social-value component of its 
rationale as a variable that is thrown into the mix only where 
the expression is particularly harmful.  In other words, because 
the harmful categories articulated also are of “slight social 
value,” the cost of a deprivation is “outweighed” by the benefit 
of averting harm.  Under this third interpretation, the low-
value attribute only becomes relevant in the case of certain 
harmful speech, and is only relevant as a way of double-
checking that the spirit of the First Amendment is not being 
infringed when an especially harmful category of speech is 
excluded from full First Amendment protection.  If we are 
confident that this harmful speech we are prohibiting is also 
“no essential part of any exposition of ideas”60 and at most, of 
“slight” value, we can be more comfortable that on balance, 
allowing the abridgment of such speech is the right thing to do. 
However, it is unfortunately a fourth interpretation that 
 
59.  Id.  
60.  Id.  
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has dominated the scholarship and the judicial interpretation 
of Chaplinsky’s dictum.  Under this interpretation, the 
categorical approach outlined in the case is foundationally 
about something called “low-value” speech.  As I shall argue, 
this has led to unmerited criticism of the categorical, or two-
level, method of content-based speech protection.  Yet, because 
it has been repeated so frequently, for so many years, this view 
of Chaplinsky lives on.  Indeed, First Amendment law school 
casebooks are sometimes structured around this “low-value” 
distinction.61  Adding to the confusion, it is not always clear 
that when the phrase “low value speech” is used, the author is 
suggesting that the expression has been deemed less valuable 
as speech.  Sometimes “low value” speech is used as a 
shorthand catchall for any speech that falls into a less 
protected category, regardless of why it has been placed in that 
category.  It is not uncommon for the words “low value” to be 
used to describe speech that passed a certain harm threshold or 
that has simply been historically unprotected. 
 
Where the Scholars Stand: A Sampling 
 
There are, as we have seen, many ways of summing up the 
doctrinal legacy of Chaplinsky.  The preeminent First 
Amendment scholar Ronald K.L. Collins for example, describes 
Chaplinsky’s dictum as consisting of just “two separate 
prongs . . . the categories prong . . . [and] the low-value speech 
prong [which is] premised less on particular categories of 
speech than on the value of the expression in question.”62  This 
summation, while having the virtue of disaggregating the 
categorical approach from the “low-value” one, does not account 
for Chaplinsky’s other possible interpretations, all of which 
have been reflected at different times in various Supreme 
Court decisions.63  The confusion and inconsistency of the 
 
61.  See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE et al., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1134 (7th 
ed. 2013). 
62.  Collins, supra note 41, at 417, 422. 
63.  See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551-52 (2012) 
(Breyer, J., concurring) (advocating for an intermediate scrutiny approach 
that would look to both the harm and value of the speech and balance their 
respective weights); Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) 
(advocating for history and tradition approach); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 
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scholarship in this area is not surprising in light of the Court’s 
lack of clarity. 
In a widely cited exchange in Northwestern Law Review, 
two constitutional law luminaries – Cass Sunstein and Larry 
Alexander – sparred about the merits of distinguishing 
between low and high value speech.  To Sunstein, valuing 
speech is something akin to a necessary evil, a “difficult and 
unpleasant task” that cannot be avoided in an optimal system 
of free expression.64  Indeed, Sunstein conceptualizes value 
classification as a speech-protective alternative to the much-
worse prospect, “authoriz[ing] government to distinguish 
among ideas on their merits.”65  To Sunstein, categorizing 
certain speech based upon its content where it “lies somewhat 
afield from the core concerns of the first amendment,”66 is 
strongly preferred over raw  viewpoint discrimination.  And 
while, according to Sunstein, harm may also be a basis for 
categorizing speech as not fully protected, limiting inquiries to 
harm alone would be “intolerable.”67  This assessment is 
ostensibly rooted in speech-protective concerns.  Sunstein 
worries that looking to harm alone would mean opening all 
speech to harm analysis and, as a consequence, lowering the 
burden for suppressing speech across the board to all categories 
of expression.68  However, Sunstein goes on to acknowledge a 
concern not rooted in speech-protection: that is, if the harm-
only approach were interpreted to mean that an equally 
stringent standard applies to all speech, regardless of whether 
it is political, commercial, libelous or pornographic.69  To 
Sunstein, this approach would “fail to draw lines that ought to 
be drawn,” suggesting that, quite simply, all speech is not 
created equal.70  Applying the same singular standard to all 
speech does not acknowledge this truth.  It would also, 
according to Sunstein, most likely result in tacit but unspoken 
 
U.S. 444 (1969) (advocating for harm-centered approach).  
64.  Cass R. Sunstein, Low Value Speech Revisited, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 
555, 557 (1989).  
65.  Id. 
66.  Id. at 555. 
67.  Id. at 558. 
68.  Id. 
69.  Sunstein, supra note 64, at 558.  
70.  Id. 
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(and unspeakable) value judgments by courts, covertly playing 
a role in their harm analysis.71 
Larry Alexander, in contrast, finds no place for “low” and 
“high” value distinctions.72  Aside from the practical challenges 
of parsing the valuable from the less valuable, Alexander sees 
the distinction as resting on an intractable fallacy: “Such 
division assume[s] that, for purposes of ‘freedom of speech’ 
values, ‘speech’ resides in an object, such as a printed page, a 
frame of film, or a series of sounds, rather than in the 
derivation of meaning from . . . the audience or in the intended 
meaning of the speaker.”73  Citing just one example, obscenity, 
he points out that a category of unprotected expression cannot 
be valued without reference to the context in which it is 
received or conveyed.74  Who is to decide whether allegedly 
pornographic language in a respected novel is to be interpreted 
in light of the entire work (high value) or in isolation (low 
value)?75  What if the pornography at issue is utilized as part of 
a legitimate academic study on human behavior?76  For 
Alexander, the error is not in attempting to distinguish among 
different types of speech in order to determine, for First 
Amendment purposes, what can or cannot be restricted, but 
rather, the use of the value-based taxonomy to accomplish 
this.77 
The preeminent First Amendment scholar, Daniel Farber, 
has likewise rejected the low value distinction, observing that 
the Court has historically looked to inconsistent sources to 
classify speech.78  Yet, Farber argues that with most categories, 
the Court has been more likely to rely upon a harm principle to 
justify reduced First Amendment protection.  Farber 
conceptualizes the Court’s categorical approach as something 
like an automatic compelling interest test.79  The government is 
 
71.  Id. 
72.  Larry Alexander, Low Value Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (1989). 
73.  Id. at 547. 
74.  Id. at 547-48.  
75.  Id. at 551. 
76.  Id. 
77.  Alexander, supra note 72, at 552. 
78.  Daniel A. Farber, The Categorical Approach to Protecting Speech in 
American Constitutional Law, 84 IND. L.J. 917, 933 (2009). 
79.  Id. at 932. 
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presumed to have a compelling interest in restricting certain 
categories of speech, such that as a default proposition an 
abridgement of that speech will pass strict scrutiny – whether 
it is consumer fraud, perjury in a courtroom, or incitement of 
imminent violence.80  Although this is not generally the 
language the Court uses to describe its categorical doctrinal 
approach, to Farber, it effectively captures what the Court is 
typically doing.81  As discussed earlier, there are quite simply 
some common sense domains that convincingly suggest that 
the First Amendment cannot be absolute.  To Farber, these 
have typically been limited to categories of speech in which the 
state – justifiably – has a compelling interest to regulate.82 
However, not all categories have fit this mold.  There are 
anomalous categories, Farber explains.  The Court has justified 
these categories primarily on the basis of their inherent “low 
value,” and not due to a compelling need to suppress.83  Farber 
identifies two such categories: obscenity and commercial 
speech.84  “Obscenity seems to be proscribed less because it 
threatens a compelling interest and more because the Court 
views sexual speech as inherently less valuable than other 
kinds of speech.”85  Likewise, the Court’s commercial speech 
doctrine is built around a four-part intermediate scrutiny test 
that explicitly rejects the need for a compelling state interest to 
regulate such expression; instead, the Court requires just a 
“substantial interest.”86 
So, other than these categories of obscenity and 
commercial speech, Farber sees the animating principle behind 
unprotected categories to be harm-based, a compelling need by 
the government to regulate certain narrow types of speech.  
Farber, in other words, inverts a conventional wisdom of many 
scholars and jurists – rooted in a common reading of the 
Chaplinsky dictum – that the categorical approach is 
 
80.  Id. at 919. 
81.  Id. at 931. 
82.  Id. at 932. 
83.  Farber, supra note 78, at 933. 
84.  Id.  
85.  Id. at 934. 
86.  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 
U.S. 557, 564 (1980). 
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necessarily tethered to a concept of “low value” speech.  
Instead, he sees the cases where they are tethered as 
anomalous.  Indeed, he remains troubled by these low-value-
justified categories, expressing concern that the Court’s 
treatment of this expression frequently appears “ad hoc.”87  In 
the case of obscenity, Farber sees a category that is a mere 
“reflection of prudish Puritanism.”88  Thus, although Farber 
appears to be critical of the low value criterion, he 
characterizes the move toward a categorical approach as “a real 
judicial achievement.”89 
There is no indication that the categorical approach will be 
going away any time soon.  In recent decades, many members 
of the Court have struck a similar posture, accepting the two-
tiered methodology, but rejecting as its foundation the “low 
value” criterion.90  Justice Stevens favorably cited a lower court 
decision proclaiming that the “First Amendment is a value-free 
provision . . . .”91  And it is self-evident why a version of the 
categorical approach that looks to harm (or the compelling 
interest of the state), rather than the ostensible value of the 
speech, is favored by free speech advocates.  It would seem to 
be the narrowest path to resolving the non-absolute absolute 
problem.  Even if, as a practical reality, the First Amendment 
cannot be absolute, at a minimum it would seem to mandate 
that governments not be permitted to judge the value of speech 
for society – or more importantly, for any one individual.  
Rather, they may only restrict speech where it is absolutely 
necessary – where there is a compelling interest and no viable 
alternative. 
This harm approach, of course, does come with its own set 
of risks.  Just like the dubious endeavor of determining a 
universal value of particular speech, a compelling state interest 
may equally be in the eye of the beholder.  In other words, 
could the harm principle be grease for the descent down a 
slippery slope?  Should every new claim by a government that 
it has the power to abridge a certain category of speech turn on 
 
87.  Farber, supra note 78, at 919, 935.  
88.  Id. at 935. 
89.  Id. at 921. 
90.  See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010). 
91.  Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 419 (1988) (citations omitted).  
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the eloquence of its “compelling” justification?  Governments 
establish new policies every day, and in doing so make new 
arguments for why these policies are of the utmost importance.  
Some might fear that the compelling interest model is an open 
call for new categories of First Amendment exclusion, a recipe 
for expanding rather than circumscribing speech suppression. 
 
The New History and Tradition Emphasis 
 
Under the leadership of Chief Justice Roberts, the Court’s 
open embrace of the categorical approach has continued to 
grow in zeal.  However, when it comes to defining those 
categories, its focus has shifted to another aspect of the 
Chaplinsky dictum, and the history and tradition of excluding 
the category of speech at issue.  Gregory Magarian argues that 
this emphasis is indeed new – akin to “major conceptual 
innovation” – despite the Court’s insistence that by focusing on 
tradition, it is merely following in the footsteps of the Court’s 
free speech precedents.92  Magarian may be correct to observe 
that the reasoning in the Court’s recent First Amendment 
decisions has shifted; however, it is a shift that is arguably 
rooted in the original Chaplinsky dictum – the case that first 
planted the categorical seed, flawed and imprecise as its 
language may have been.  The setting of this observed shift is 
also notable.  As an area of First Amendment law with an 
unfortunate legacy of doctrinal ambiguity, the Roberts Court’s 
“categorical” free speech cases were decided in the context of 
this longstanding need for clarity.  The Court was, in other 
words, simply filling a void.  The Court has stressed tradition 
(or the absence thereof) in a cluster of content-based cases in 
which it was asked to carve out new categories of unprotected 
speech,93 and the Court was in the position of justifying its 
repeated answer: “No.” 
Magarian is nonetheless quite critical of the tradition-
based analysis that is taking center stage at the same time 
 
92.  Gregory P. Magarian, The Marrow of Tradition: The Roberts Court 
and Categorical First Amendment Speech Exclusions, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1339, 1347 (2015).  
93.  See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 460; Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 564 
U.S. 786 (2011). 
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that low value and harm-centered justifications fade into the 
background.94  Magarian offers a nuanced assessment of a 
categorical approach that at once lauds the Court for its pro-
free speech destination while largely lamenting the route the 
Court has taken to get there.95  Of course, history and tradition 
are hallmarks of contemporary conservative constitutional 
analysis, and this reliance on the past is hardly limited to the 
arena of free speech.  Thus, some of the very same criticisms 
that might apply to the use of history and tradition more 
broadly may apply with equal vigor to the First Amendment.  
Magarian takes issue with the potential for manipulation of 
this historical approach, i.e. “the fact that reasonable people 
disagree both about what traditions exist and about how, and 
how much, tradition should matter” and whether judges have 
the “institutional competence” to play the role of historians.96  
One might also lament the way tradition may be used to 
obscure the underlying substantive reasons for the Court’s 
decision,97 and stress that limiting speech protection to what 
was traditionally afforded might ultimately defeat the broader 
constitutional purpose of preventing current political majorities 
from suppressing current minorities.98 
Regardless of how one generally stands on the heavy 
reliance on history and tradition so characteristic of today’s 
conservatives, it must be acknowledged that the First 
Amendment is its own distinctive area of jurisprudence, with 
its own doctrinal challenges and substantive concerns.  The 
tradition-based orientation has some undeniable benefits (from 
a free speech perspective) when used in conjunction with the 
categorical approach.  Specifically, it may allay reticence 
associated with the “low value” and “harm-based” routes to 
defining unprotected categories.  On its face, it would seem to 
stop both justifications in their tracks.  Under the history and 
tradition construct, there is slim likelihood of new broad 
declarations that some as-of-yet-undeclared category of speech 
is not “valuable,” and thus unprotected.  Enlightened 
 
94.  See Magarian, supra note 55. 
95.  Id.  
96.  Id. at 1356. 
97.  Id. 
98.  Id. at 1357. 
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modernity just won’t cut it under a tradition-based analysis.  If 
misogynistic speech by men-being-men in 1950 was, at the 
time, a socially-valued display of masculinity, but is today 
thought to be of “low-value” or even “valueless” by a majority of 
Americans, such speech would still remain protected; there 
would simply be no longstanding history or tradition of 
allowing its suppression. 
A similar principle would be true of the slippery slope 
concerns endemic to a harm-based approach.  If it wasn’t 
“compelling” yesterday to suppress a particular category of 
speech, under the history and tradition approach, it is not 
enough for it to be “compelling” today.  Like a fine wine, history 
and tradition require patience.  The ultimate effect of the 
history and tradition approach, in other words, is to profoundly 
limit the ability of courts or policy makers to expand the list of 
categories to which free speech is not guaranteed.  Granted, as 
the Court has acknowledged, “[m]aybe there are some 
categories of speech that have been historically unprotected, 
but have not yet been specifically identified or discussed as 
such in our case law.”99  However, it would presumably be a 
daunting task to substantiate such a class, particularly with 
many decades of vigorous free speech litigation behind us.  
Presumably, most historically rooted First Amendment 
exceptions, if they exist at all, have been identified by now.  In 
this respect, the history and tradition approach is likely to be 
highly speech-protective. 
However, these advantages can also cut in the opposite 
direction.  History and tradition might have the effect of 
locking in the poor categorical choices of the past – perhaps like 
obscenity or fighting words – even when the justification for 
unprotected status may appear to be anachronistic to much of 
the population.  A harm or low-value based assessment of 
categorical exclusions – as opposed to a history and tradition 
analysis – might mean greater responsiveness to the present.  
Sexually explicit material that was once considered so deeply 
offensive that a vast majority of the country “knew it when 
they saw it,” today, may elicit a mere shrug, and to many 
others even represent a powerful (and valuable) expression of 
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what it means to be human.  Abrasive face-to-face 
confrontational language that, in an earlier era, appeared 
harmful as a matter of common sense – because no “self-
respecting man” would allow such words to be spoken without 
resorting to immediate physical retaliation – today, may 
appear to be an expression of passion that projects the 
intensity of a genuine human reaction, one that has value in its 
forceful conveyance of an idea.  What were once “fighting 
words” may today appear, at worst, to be “bad form.”  One 
might feel that the speaker could have found a more productive 
way to express his anger, but not, as in the past, assume that 
such words will naturally result in a violent, physical response.  
Our understanding of “value” and “harm” changes over time.  A 
history and tradition approach might prevent us from 
correcting mistakes from the past – or, at minimum, updating 
First Amendment doctrine to reflect contemporary reality – 
and returning a formerly unprotected category to protected 
status. 
Indeed, we might look to the 1971 decision of Cohen v. 
California as an example of such correcting for the past.100  
Almost three decades had passed since the Chaplinsky Court 
casually tossed “the profane” into its list of too-obvious-for-
elaboration categorical exceptions to First Amendment 
protection.101  Yet, in Cohen, the Court unequivocally declared 
that the display of the words “F*** the Draft” on one’s clothing 
was protected speech.102  Explicitly relying upon the two-level 
approach, the Court concluded that “this case cannot be said to 
fall within those relatively few categories of instances where 
prior decisions have established the power of government to 
deal more comprehensively with certain forms of individual 
expression.”103  It reasoned that this crude language did not, on 
its own, fall within the established categories of obscenity or 
fighting words, or of intentionally provoking a group to a 
hostile reaction.104  Although the Court did not describe its 
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decision as such, Cohen might be seen as an example of the 
Court unaccepting a class of expression – returning it to fully 
protected status.  In this enlightened period of the early 1970s, 
the Court’s moderately conservative Justice Harlan famously 
observed – in a manner that was perhaps invisible to a 
previous generation – that “one man’s vulgarity is another’s 
lyric.”105  While the outcome of a historical counterfactual may 
be stubbornly resistant to proof, we might reasonably conclude 
that if the Court of 1971 had been as wedded to “history and 
tradition” as today’s Court, it may have been much more 
reluctant to quietly read “profanity” out of the Chaplinsky 
formulation. 
Nevertheless, framing constitutional doctrine is often more 
about working within the confines of reality than it is about 
finding perfection.  The framers did not provide perfection.  
Since an absolutist interpretation of the First Amendment is 
untenable, the Court must struggle to find the next best 
alternative.  Each choice is bound to be fraught with distinct 
disadvantages, providing unlimited fodder for law review 
articles and openings for clever First Amendment lawyers.  
This truth is also what makes choosing not to choose – by, for 
example, declining to adequately define and delimit established 
unprotected categories – and simply opting, instead, for a 
covert form of ad hoc balancing, so tempting. Drawing a bold 
line according to “history and tradition” may be subject to a 
range of justifiable criticisms, yet First Amendment scholars 
may, at the same time, rightfully celebrate the clarity of the 
line, for this line has amounted to some impressively speech-
protective decisions. 
It led the Court in 2010 to reject the claim that depictions 
of animal cruelty should be declared a new category of 
 
similar to traditional “time, place and manner” limitations.  These decisions 
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unprotected speech.106  The Court heavily rooted its decision in 
United States v. Stevens in the history and tradition rubric, 
emphasizing the government’s failure to identify a “tradition 
excluding depictions of animal cruelty from ‘the freedom of 
speech.’”107  This, in itself, is notable.  But what is arguably 
even more significant was the Court’s seeming rejection of a 
categorical analysis based in harm and low value – at least in 
the raw form proposed by the defenders of the law. 
As a method of determining whether a new exception to 
First Amendment coverage should be added, the government 
proposed “a categorical balancing of the value of the speech 
against its societal costs.”108  Of course, the Chaplinsky dictum 
does not dictate that its “low value” and “harm” based 
justifications be used in conjunction with one another, nor that 
they be employed as part of a balancing test.  It could just as 
easily be understood to provide a strict cut-off: speech with 
harm above x threshold or speech with value below y threshold 
is unprotected by the First Amendment, case closed.  
Nevertheless, the Court’s reliance on a tradition-based analysis 
allowed it to outright reject the government’s formulation, one 
that would seem to permit an open-ended consideration of a 
limitless array of newly-proposed categories for First 
Amendment exclusion under the purported logic that the 
expression at hand is particularly harmful or valueless. The 
Court was alarmed by such a suggestion.  “As a free-floating 
test for First Amendment coverage,” the Stevens majority 
asserted that the government’s proposal was “startling and 
dangerous.”109 
The Court was making an important point.  Conventional 
wisdom and sheer intuition might suggest that a categorical 
approach, by cabining those few narrow areas of expression 
that cannot be offered full protection and guaranteeing the 
rest, is highly speech protective.  However, this is only so if it is 
structured as a disciplined and circumscribed rule, and not a 
loose and malleable standard.  Calling one’s approach 
“categorical” is not enough to distinguish it from the case-by-
 
106.  See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 469.  
107.  Id. 
108.  Id. at 470.  
109.  Id. at 470. 
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case balancing that many First Amendment advocates decry.  
Indeed, embracing balancing as part of a two-level methodology 
might be more dangerous to First Amendment values, for 
unlike case-by-case balancing, a categorical balance speaks to 
an entire category of speech and has the power to declare vast 
areas of expression unprotected.  The Stevens Court does not 
equivocate on this point: 
 
The First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech 
does not extend only to categories of speech that 
survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social 
costs and benefits. The First Amendment itself 
reflects a judgment by the American people that 
the benefits of its restrictions on the Government 
outweigh the costs.110 
 
What Kind of Categorical Approach? 
 
So, even when we move past the debate over whether or 
not to employ a categorical approach, we must confront the 
question of how this categorical approach will work.  Should 
balancing play any role whatsoever in a two-tier First 
Amendment analysis?  Is it ever possible to completely do away 
with balancing, or is it simply a matter of degree?  And what do 
we mean by “balancing?”  Are there alternative methods of 
balancing that may be used within, or in order to define, 
particular categories?  Although the Court, in the years since 
Chaplinsky, has offered neither clarity nor consistency on these 
questions, they are matters that have been considered by 
scholars. 
As we saw above, the Court in Stevens dismissed the 
government’s suggestion that unprotected categories be 
determined through a cost benefit analysis, pejoratively 
referring to this as “ad hoc balancing.”111  However, scholars 
such as Melville Nimmer have traditionally distinguished the 
kind of balancing that might be used to define entire 
unprotected categories of speech from an open-ended balancing 
 
110.  Id. 
111.  Stevens, 559 U.S. at 460-61.  
28https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/1
 2016 CATEGORICAL APPROACH TO FREE SPEECH 29 
that would assess each claim of unprotected speech 
independently.112  The former, often referred to as “definitional” 
or “categorical” balancing, was distinguished from “ad hoc” 
balancing, and was considered more speech protective because 
it “takes place at a higher level of generalization.”113  Thus, 
although some balancing might be understood to be essential, 
to Nimmer, what was critical was that definitional balancing 
(very much unlike ad hoc balancing) resulted in a clear rule 
that could be used in future cases.114  Accepting that such 
balancing must occur acknowledges a vitally important and 
difficult role for judges, for they must use their judgment to 
balance interests.115  However, with definitional balancing, 
they are drawing boundaries not only for the present – for the 
case at hand – but for the future as well.116  The stakes are, in 
this sense, much higher than with ad hoc balancing.  But these 
higher stakes serve many speech-protective interests.  These 
stakes may make a court much more reluctant to deny free 
speech in a particular case because doing so requires setting a 
categorical precedent that will likely have profound 
repercussions.  A clear rule resulting from definitional 
balancing also provides greater certainty for both future 
speakers and future regulators who will act with greater 
confidence in their expressive (or regulatory) choices without 
fear that their words will be unprotected or their regulations 
will be deemed unconstitutional.  It reduces the risk of self-
censorship by speakers who might have good reason to be 
insecure; after all, who can predict the outcome of an ad hoc 
balance of one particular court?  It also provides clarity for a 
government regulator with an interest in combatting a narrow 
type of especially harmful expression. 
Constraints, which come in many forms, are a big piece of 
what makes a legal system distinguishable from politics.  Ad 
hoc balancing, however, significantly frees judges from 
 
112.  See Norman T. Deutsch, Professor Nimmer Meets Professor 
Schauer (and Others): An Analysis of “Definitional Balancing” as a 
Methodology for Determining the “Visible Boundaries of the First 
Amendment,” 39 AKRON L. REV. 483, 489-94 (2006). 
113.  Id. at 490. 
114.  Id. at 491. 
115.  Id. at 492. 
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constraint and gives them the freedom to act more like 
politicians to be responsive to public pressure, personal 
predilection, and ideology.  As Nimmer pointed out, it is 
moments of “national hysteria” when the values of free speech 
become most critical,117 and when the all-too- natural human 
impulse for judges to balance away First Amendment rights 
becomes hardest to resist.118  As the red-scare-era Dennis 
decision discussed earlier illustrates, accepting ad hoc 
balancing means giving courts greater leeway to make 
decisions that, in retrospect, may turn out to be highly 
regrettable. 
Thus, for Nimmer, balancing itself is not the enemy of free 
speech, as long as that balance is used categorically and not 
case-by-case.119  We might note however, that the Stevens 
Court in 2010 collapsed definitional balancing and ad hoc 
balancing.  By referring to the government’s proposed approach 
as “ad hoc balancing,” rather than how it would be traditionally 
labeled – “definitional balancing” – the Court was sending a 
message that the government’s approach to definitional 
balancing had some of the same free speech dangers 
traditionally equated with a case-by-case approach.120  In other 
words, the government’s category-by-category approach looked 
eerily similar to case-by-case ad hoc balancing.  The Court’s 
critique does not come out of thin air. 
Alexander Aleinikoff, one of the most prominent scholarly 
critics of balancing, has argued that even in the categorical 
setting, balancing should – and can – be avoided.121  Indeed 
Aleinikoff – apparently like the contemporary Roberts Court – 
sees little difference between definitional balancing and ad hoc 
balancing; as he explained, “[n]ew situations present new 
interests and different weights for old interests.  If these are 
allowed to re-open the balancing process, then every case 
becomes one of an ‘ad hoc’ balance . . . .”122  To Aleinikoff, the 
 
117.  Id. at 492. 
118.  Id.  
119.  Id. at 489. 
120.  Stevens, 559 U.S. at 460.  
121.  T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of 
Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987). 
122.  Id. at 980. 
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widely-held assertion that balancing is inevitable once one 
recognizes that a particular constitutional right cannot be 
absolute is simply incorrect.123  Even though (as discussed) the 
First Amendment was drafted in absolutist language, 
categorical exceptions to free speech need not be explained as a 
result of a balancing of the interests at stake or a cost-benefit 
analysis.  They may be understood “as resting upon a principle 
internal to the constitutional provision.”124  Yes, the imperative 
to carve out a free speech exception for revealing military 
secrets that would imperil the country’s likelihood of success 
during wartime might be explained as a rational balance in 
which a court decides that the sacrifice of freedom involved is 
less weighty than the costs of maintaining that freedom.  
However, to Aleinikoff, such categorical exception could just as 
easily be explained by way of a principle internal to the First 
Amendment, that the freedoms within its ambit are premised 
upon a political system that survives, and functions 
effectively.125  Other scholars have pointed to a range of First 
Amendment values – even though unspecified in the 
Amendment itself – that may be used to identify excepted 
categories.  These may come from many sources, including the 
philosophical, historic or political origins underlying the 
amendment and constitution as a whole.126  These values, in 
conjunction with an array of interpretive techniques, may 
coherently justify particular excluded categories without resort 
to balancing.127  Balancing, in other words, even of the 
definitional variety favored by Nimmer, should not be 
presumed to be an essential part of a categorical approach to 
the First Amendment. 
Regardless of where one stands one the foundations of the 
categorical approach to the First Amendment, whether one 
adopts a low-value, harm-based, or “history and tradition” 
justification for the categories chosen, or some combination of 
these three, or whether one believes balancing to be an 
inevitable part of the categorical approach or something that is 
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124.  Id. at 1000. 
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avoidable and ideally should be avoided, there is also 
commonality.  Once one accepts the categorical methodology as 
the preferred approach, which many scholars and a majority of 
the Court have done, it becomes a matter of great interest to 
assess how it is actually used.  It is one thing to say that the 
categorical or two-level approach will or should be used in the 
case of a content-based governmental abridgement of speech, 
but it is another to see how it plays out in practice.  It is this 
question that I move to next.  For purposes of this inquiry, I 
will focus on one particular category chosen by the Court for 
special non- or lesser-protected First Amendment status: true 
threats. 
 
Categories, and More Categories 
 
Frederick Schauer has observed that “[t]here are an 
infinite number of ways of drawing distinctions and therefore 
an infinite number of potential categories.”128  Since 
Chaplinsky, not only has the number of lesser-protected 
categories grown, but as the Court’s precedents have fleshed 
out each such category individually, nuances and 
idiosyncrasies have become evident.  It has become 
increasingly clear that each category serves a distinct 
purpose.129  In practice, this has meant that the image of a 
categorical approach as simple dichotomous, either-or 
proposition is inapposite.  Indeed, today, calling the categorical 
approach a “two-level” methodology is somewhat misleading.  
Because “not all forms of speech are necessarily amenable to 
the same analytic approach,”130 the Court has developed 
distinctive methodologies for lesser-protected categories of 
expression.131  Even as the categories themselves are relatively 
static, these methodologies for individual categories have 
continued to evolve in response to new fact patterns and social 
understandings that are ever changing. 
Three-quarters of a century ago, commercial speech was 
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said to receive no First Amendment protection – declared to be 
an unprotected category just one month after Chaplinsky was 
decided.132  However, over time, the Court determined that 
commercial speech was deserving of some protection.133  Over 
this same period, the definition of commercial speech was 
narrowed and specified with greater precision.134  By 1980, in 
an opinion drafted by Justice Powell, the Court settled on a 
four-part test tailored specifically for commercial speech, 
widely understood to represent a form of intermediate 
scrutiny.135  The Central Hudson test was the product of a 
Justice keenly aware of the need for clarity vis-à-vis the 
categorical method.  Justice Powell’s law clerk David O. 
Stewart – who worked on an original draft of the Central 
Hudson opinion – recounted how Justice Powell “worried that 
the Court’s opinions should provide clear guidance to lawyers 
and judges about how to apply the ruling in future cases.  As a 
lifelong practicing lawyer, he was very sensitive to that 
concern.”136  In a 1980 memo to Justice Powell, Stewart agreed 
that now was the time: with commercial speech it seemed 
“appropriate to try to apply a disciplined approach instead of 
the more ad-hoc balancing methods used in the earlier 
cases.”137 
The story was similar with defamation – a type of speech 
that was listed in the Chaplinsky dictum as an example of an 
unprotected category.138  Defamation would receive a speech-
protective makeover in the celebrated New York Times v. 
Sullivan case of 1964.139  In Sullivan, and a series of cases in 
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its wake, the Court qualified and dramatically narrowed the 
types of defamation that may be subject to civil damages, 
protecting defamatory speech directed against government 
officials and public figures unless that defamatory falsehood is 
made with actual malice.140 
Commercial speech and defamation provide just two 
illustrations of how the Court might adapt the categorical 
approach to the complex nature of human expression.  
Although it may seem desirable to adopt a streamlined two-
level methodology in which all non-protected categories of 
speech are subject to the same analysis, such an approach 
would come at a high cost.  There is often good reason to 
establish different tests for different categories of speech. Each 
category presents its own unique set of concerns – distinctive 
harms and distinctive speech interests.  One cannot, for 
example, fairly assert that the democratic significance of being 
able to freely criticize public officials – even where the factual 
foundation for such criticisms prove to be false – is somehow 
equivalent to the economic effects of making dubious claims 
about a product in a commercial advertisement.  As Schauer 
points out: 
 
Freedom of speech need not have any one 
“essential” feature.  It is much more likely a 
bundle of interrelated principles sharing no 
common set of necessary and sufficient defining 
characteristics.  It is quite possible that the 
protection of political discussion and criticism, 
the aversion to censorship of art, and the desire 
to retain open inquiry in science and other 
academic disciplines, for example, are principles 
not reducible to any one common core.141 
 
Threats, like commercial speech and defamation, come 
with their own distinctive set of concerns.  On a common-sense 
level, threats seem remarkably simple.  The straight-forward 
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34https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/1
 2016 CATEGORICAL APPROACH TO FREE SPEECH 35 
definition of a “threat” is uncontroversial: “a statement that 
expresses the speaker’s intention to harm the target.”142  As 
discussed in the beginning of this piece, threats present the 
quintessential illustration of why we need First Amendment 
exceptions: it would be the very rare individual who does not 
see a need to punish the words “your money or your life.”  At 
the same time, relative to other excepted categories of speech – 
such as child pornography, commercial speech and defamation 
– defining a threat in the real world can be remarkably 
difficult. 
Human expression is deeply contextual.  ‘Expressing an 
intention to harm’ could include the physical insecurity 
imposed by an aggressive negotiator who affords little personal 
space to his listener, and who speaks with sharp language and 
great intensity.  Body language, facial expressions and physical 
proximity – even without explicitly threatening words – may, 
to many, convey a threat.  On the other hand, threatening 
words of the most direct variety, which may, if printed on a 
piece of paper, leave no doubt that a threat was present, might 
have a completely different meaning when heard in context.  
The threatening words might have been quoting someone else’s 
speech from long in the past, or might have been spoken by a 
comedian on a stage.  They might convey irony, sarcasm or 
hyperbole.  Furthermore, a threat, unlike child pornography, 
requires subjective perception.  A listener might hear a threat 
when the speaker only intended to convey excitement.  An 
ineffectual provocateur may do everything within her power to 
threaten her targeted victims, yet her words may be laughed 
off by everyone in earshot – taken by no one as a serious threat.  
And what of the socially tone-deaf listener?  She might not feel 
threatened by words that a reasonable person – in a similar 
context – would perceive to be a threat.  Should this speech be 
protected?  And what of the tone-deaf speaker whose words 
would reasonably be interpreted as a threat, but who had no 
intention to threaten, or who lacked knowledge that his 
expression would likely be interpreted as a threat? 
These are difficult questions.  With a categorical approach, 
 
142.  Kenneth L. Karst, Threats and Meanings: How the Facts Govern 
First Amendment Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1337, 1355-56 (2006). 
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however, difficult questions are inevitable.  It may be clear that 
a categorical exception for a certain type of speech is needed, 
but this is just the first step.  To avoid relapsing into ad hoc 
balancing, the courts must next move on to the crucial business 
of getting into the weeds.  Distinctions must be parsed, and 
difficult questions must be answered in a principled manner.  
This takes courage, because Supreme Court precedents are not 
easily undone.  But a categorical approach without defined 
categories is arguably worse than a half-measure; over time, it 
may become a constitutional wound.  It says: we will take the 
profound (but necessary) step of declaring an entire category of 
speech outside the ambit of a constitutional provision that is, 
by its own terms, absolute, but we will not finish the job.  We 
will allow lower courts to come to a range of inconsistent 
conclusions about how that categorical exclusion should work 
in practice. 
With many areas of constitutional law, leaving open 
unanswered questions is not terribly problematic.  However, 
the concerns are much greater with speech.  For the longer the 
high court sits back and declines to decide, the more 
uncertainty settles in.  The Court’s own precedents, in fact, 
have acknowledged a sort of special status for free speech, 
requiring greater precision from First Amendment decisions 
than is required in other areas of constitutional adjudication.143  
As the Court itself has many times acknowledged (and many 
tyrannical leaders have long understood), legal insecurity is 
one of the most potent enemies of expressive freedom.  Where it 
is unclear what one may or may not say without legal sanction, 
where one’s fate is in the hands of a court that might – or 
might not – decide that one’s speech is unprotected, where one 
has little ability to predict which way a court will rule, self-
censorship is a likely result. 
Fifty years ago, the Court delved into the weeds with 
regard to the excluded speech-category of defamation.  With a 
keen sensitivity to the First Amendment stakes at hand, the 
Court rejected an ad hoc case-by-case approach and articulated 
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crisp rules for determining when speech is unprotected 
defamation and when even defamatory speech is to be shielded 
by the First Amendment from liability.144  This allowed for 
certainty where there was formerly insecurity.  It gave the 
press freedom to aggressively criticize political leaders without 
the speech-inhibiting fear that an inadvertent factual error 
would lead to financial ruin.  New York Times v. Sullivan was, 
as Alexander Meiklejohn put it, an “occasion for dancing in the 
streets.”145  When it comes to threats, however, the contrast 
could not be greater.  The Court has distinguished so-called 
“true threats” from all others – explaining that only “true 
threats” are unprotected.146  However, other than providing 
this initial distinction, the Court’s guidance on the true threats 
category has been despairingly paltry. 
 
The True Threats Category 
 
In 1969, the First Amendment was on an upswing.  This 
was the year Watts v. U.S. was decided, the first official 
acknowledgment of a categorical exception to the First 
Amendment for true threats.147  This final year of the Warren 
Court was an optimistic period for free speech jurisprudence.  
The Court seemed to understand that an embrace of a 
categorical approach meant a concomitant responsibility to 
define with precision just what those categories were.  Not only 
had the Court just decided New York Times v. Sullivan five 
years earlier, clarifying and narrowing the defamation 
exclusion, in Brandenburg v. Ohio it had just resolved the most 
vexing and longstanding of categorical first amendment 
issues.148  Here, it decisively cast off the balancing approach of 
Dennis in favor of a clear and circumscribed definition of 
incitement.149  To fall outside of the First Amendment’s 
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protection, “advocacy of the use of force or of law violation . . . 
[must be] directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless 
action and . . . [must be] likely to incite or produce such 
action.”150  In one fell swoop, the mother lode of categorical 
dilemmas – one that had plagued the Court for fifty years – 
was largely resolved.  Through a principled and relatively 
precise articulation of the category of incitement, the Court 
radically narrowed the freedom of future courts to do what was 
done in Dennis, to bend to the political and social pressures of 
the times and expand the ambit of an unprotected category at 
will. 
Watts, while not as ambitious as Brandenburg, was of the 
same cloth.  The setting was at the time remarkably routine: a 
public rally at the Washington mall addressing war and peace 
and police brutality.151  The ostensibly threatening statement 
was made by an 18 year-old malcontent who had just been 
drafted.152  His words – “If they ever make me carry a rifle the 
first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.” – were followed 
by laughter by both the speaker and the audience.153  It took 
just a few short pages for the Court, in a per curiam decision, to 
blithely dismiss the notion that “the kind of political hyperbole 
indulged in by the petitioner” could be prosecuted as a crime.154  
This was apparently not a difficult decision, judging from its 
brevity, but it was a significant one.  For not only did the Court 
definitively assert that true threats are an unprotected 
category of speech – the statute making threats against the 
president unlawful was declared facially constitutional – it 
reflected a very particular way of understanding the categorical 
approach to the First Amendment.155 
Definitions must be clearly delineated.  “What is a threat 
must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected 
speech,” said the Court.156  How is this to be done?  The Watts 
Court embraced a decidedly harm-based approach.  There was 
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no talk of the “low value” of threatening language.  Instead, the 
Court acknowledged the “overwhelming” governmental interest 
in keeping the president both safe and free to fulfill his duties 
without “threats of physical violence.”157  At the same time, it 
stressed that, even in light of this compelling interest, “the 
commands of the First Amendment [must be kept] clearly in 
mind.”158  Ultimately, Watts did not go beyond telling us what a 
true threat is not: it is not “political hyperbole.”159  However, 
the case set the stage for a much more in depth articulation of 
the contours of true threats, and considering the Court’s recent 
track record of taking categorical definitions seriously, it would 
have been reasonable to surmise that in the coming years, the 
Court would take up that opportunity, rather than simply 
letting the lower courts flail about.  But then, there was 
silence . . . decades of silence. 
The next significant decision addressing the category of 
true threats would not come until 2003.  Unfortunately, not 
only did the Court wait far too long to return to the issue, it 
would do so in a decision that proved deeply unsatisfying to 
many on all sides of the free speech divide.  As in Watts, the 
Court did not ultimately uphold a true threat.  Once again, the 
Court simply told us what a true threat could not be.  This 
time, with a mere plurality, the Court concluded that the 
“prima facie evidence provision” in a Virginia criminal law that 
banned cross burning was inconsistent with the First 
Amendment because it meant that the burning of a cross alone 
could suffice for conviction.160  The plurality reasoned that, 
while a symbolic cross burning may constitute “constitutionally 
proscribable intimidation” – i.e. a “true threat” – it may just as 
well have another meaning.161  “[S]ometimes the cross burning 
is a statement of ideology, a symbol of group solidarity.  It is a 
ritual used at Klan gatherings, and it is used to represent the 
Klan itself.  Thus, ‘[b]urning a cross at a political rally would 
almost certainly be protected expression.’”162 
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On its face, the holding in Virginia v. Black was a speech 
protective one: The symbolic expression at issue was protected 
by the Constitution.  At the same time, a majority of the Court 
strongly stated – in what was effectively just dicta – that “a 
State, consistent with the First Amendment, may ban cross 
burning carried out with the intent to intimidate.”163  This 
conclusion was reached despite the fact that by a conventional 
definition, intimidation is not synonymous with a threat.  
Granted, true “threats” might be said to be, by definition, 
“intimidating” – particularly if we are, in part, defining a true 
threat as one that would be effective to a reasonable person.  A 
threat that is not “intimidating” would presumably not be a 
threat harmful enough to merit exclusion from First 
Amendment protection.  However, the reverse would likely not 
be said to hold true.  The Court acknowledges as much, in its 
thoroughly circular and self-evident assertion that 
“[i]ntimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the 
word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat 
to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the 
victim in fear of bodily harm or death.”164  The Court glosses 
over what would seem to be a very important and troubling 
ambiguity when it qualifies the term “intimidation” by “in the 
constitutionally proscribable sense of the word.”165 
“Intimidating” expression is not necessarily “threatening.”  
Indeed, intimidation is a common expressive tactic used in all 
sorts of social settings.  Intimidation may be a subconscious 
byproduct of a speaker with great passion or emotion 
attempting to convey his feelings to a relatively stoic crowd.  
Heated exchanges over politics, race, sex, or religion are 
frequently volatile and can quickly become intimidating to a 
listener.  And a particularly sensitive individual may be more 
likely to feel intimidated than someone with a thicker skin.  
Threats are, in other words, a subset of intimidating 
expression.  By using the term “intimidate” throughout the 
opinion as if it were synonymous with “threaten,” the Court 
obscures the important issues raised about the true threats 
category.  The Court’s reasoning further muddied an already 
 
163.  Id. at 343. 
164.  Id. at 360. 
165.  Black, 538 U.S. at 360. 
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muddy categorical river.  This conflation of intimidation and 
threat caused much confusion. 
Furthermore, as Frederick Schauer has pointed out, a 
threat has traditionally been confined to a face-to-face 
confrontation in which a single individual – or relatively small 
group – is “[placed] . . . in reasonable fear for his personal 
safety (or personal well-being in a larger sense).”166  However, 
cross-burnings were historically used to intimidate entire 
populations and large swaths of racial, religious, and other 
minorities.  Virginia’s statute was seemingly drafted to 
incorporate such broad based intimidation, as well as 
intimidation against a single target.  By failing to clarify what 
types of intimidation of “group[s] of persons” (in the statute’s 
words) qualify as a true threat, the Court arguably threw into 
question a central assumption about what an unprotected 
threat looks like.  Indeed, one might be tempted to interpret 
Virginia v. Black as an expansion of the true threats 
categorical exception such that it now includes so-called hate 
speech directed at minority groups.  Yet, the plurality, near the 
end of the opinion, unequivocally tells us that this is not the 
case: “It may be true that a cross burning, even at a political 
rally, arouses a sense of anger or hatred among the vast 
majority of citizens who see a burning cross.  But this sense of 
anger or hatred is not sufficient to ban all cross burnings.”167  
However, proponents of hate speech laws frequently point to its 
intimidating impact on minority groups, even when such hate 
speech does not come in the form of an explicit threat.  In other 
words, it is hardly clear that hate speech and intimidation do 
not largely overlap.  Thus, for a number of reasons, the dream 
that the Court would at last add some clarity to the true 
threats category were dashed in Virginia v. Black. 
Yet, on one front, the Court did seem to speak with 
consistency, a consistency that had the potential to answer a 
long-debated query about the true threats exception: In order 
to be excluded from First Amendment protection, does a threat 
require subjective intent by the speaker?  The locus of the 
dispute in Black turned on the law’s prima facie presumption 
 
166. Frederick Schauer, Intentions, Conventions, and the First 
Amendment: The Case of Cross-Burning, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 197, 213 (2003). 
167. Black, 538 U.S. at 366.  
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that there was an “intent to intimidate” wherever there is a 
cross burning.168  The plurality could not countenance this 
presumption, describing the many alternative communicative 
intentions that might underlie a cross burning.169  In 
condemning the constitutionality of the prima facie provision of 
the Virginia law, the plurality points to the fact that “[i]t does 
not distinguish between a cross burning done with the purpose 
of creating anger or resentment and a cross burning done with 
the purpose of threatening or intimidating a victim.”170  The 
clear implication is that intentionality is critical.  A cross 
burning intended to create only anger could certainly 
intimidate observers, but the Court seemed to be suggesting 
that the subjective purpose needs to be intimidation for such 
symbolic speech to be unprotected. 
Or not.  It turned out that in the years following Black, 
scholars and judges would come to inconsistent conclusions as 
to how Black should be interpreted.  This confusion was not 
limited to the relationship between “intimidation” and “true 
threats;” it extended to the crucial question of subjective intent.  
Nevertheless, a number of top First Amendment scholars, 
including Kenneth Karst171 and Frederick Schauer,172 agreed 
that a natural reading of Black does suggest that the true 
threats category is limited to those threats spoken by 
individuals who intend to threaten.  Of course, as we shall 
discuss, this does not answer an important subsequent 
question—what kind of intent?  Intent might mean that one’s 
purpose was to threaten, but it might also mean that one is 
merely aware that one’s statement may be threatening, even 
though the words are spoken for another purpose (artistic 
expression, release of anger, sending a political message . . . 
etc.).  Nonetheless, all of these nuances become irrelevant if we 
are to reject the conclusion that the true threat exception 
includes an intentionality requirement by the speaker, as did a 
majority of Circuit Courts in Black’s wake.173 
 
168.  Id. at 347-48.  
169.  Id. at 365-66. 
170.  Id. at 366. 
171.  Karst, supra note 142, at 1358. 
172.  Schauer, supra note 166, at 217-18. 
173.  Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2018 (2015).  “Save two, 
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From the perspective of the harm principle discussed 
earlier – the premise that categorical exclusions should be 
justified by a compelling governmental interest to prevent 
certain intolerable harms – we might conclude that intent 
should be irrelevant.  After all, whether intended or not, the 
adverse impact of the threatening message on the listener 
(whether it takes the form of pervasive fear and insecurity, or 
coercion to take actions that one would otherwise not) will 
presumably be unaffected.  Larry Alexander has argued that it 
is a mistake to focus on the intention of the speaker in free 
speech analysis: “Once the First Amendment is triggered by 
virtue of government’s regulatory intention, the analysis 
should focus on the ultimate harm the government is seeking 
to avert by interdicting the receipt of a message and the causal 
mechanism through which receipt of the message leads to the 
harm.”174 
However, unless one sees the categorical approach as one 
of pure dichotomy – either the expression lacks free speech 
“value” (or imposes intolerable harm) or it does not – there 
would appear to be some critical First Amendment interests at 
stake in considering the intent of the speaker.  While value and 
harm focus on the speech itself and its impact, it is the speaker 
himself who produces the expression.  An intent-indifferent 
definition of true threats would risk encouraging self-
censorship.  Artists and polemicists whose works include 
language that could be understood to be threatening – whether 
it is rap music with aggressive lyrics or derisive social 
commentary of a sardonic comedian – may be chilled.  When 
every word must be measured to avoid the risk of prosecution, 
and when every irreverent utterance is a source of uncertainty 
and insecurity, messages that would and should be protected 
speech may be withheld from the public conversation out of 
fear. 
It is easy to forget that the Court’s traditional strict 
 
every Circuit to have considered the issue —11 in total— has held that this 
provision demands proof only of general intent, which here requires no more 
than that a defendant knew he transmitted a communication, knew the 
words used in that communication, and understood the ordinary meaning of 
those words in the relevant context.  Id. at 2018 (Thomas, J., dissenting).   
174.  Larry Alexander, Free Speech and Speaker’s Intent, 12 CONST. 
COMMENT. 21, 25 (1995). 
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scrutiny test involves not just a need for a compelling state 
interest, but a narrow-tailoring requirement in which the 
means of achieving that compelling interest must inhibit no-
more speech than necessary to address the harm.175  A nuanced 
doctrinal rule governing the true threats category might 
distinguish among various possible sanctions that would apply 
to true threats, some being more or less speech-inhibiting and 
some more or less targeted at remedying the harm imposed.  
The most urgent, and perhaps effective, method of mitigating 
the distinctive harm caused by threatening speech may be to 
simply return a sense of security to the threatened target by 
way of a temporary restraining order.  A higher level of intent 
might be required to ratchet-up the sanctions imposed.  
Without the requisite level of intent – wherever it is 
determined to lie – the First Amendment might only permit 
threatening speech to result in the imposition of a temporary 
injunction or compensatory damages, but not criminal 
penalties or punitive damages.  These are, of course, just some 
possibilities as to how a doctrinal test for true threats might be 
structured.  However, complete intent-indifference, because of 
its speech chilling potential, might be said to fail the narrow-
tailoring requirement. 
When the Court chooses to refine, in a principled manner, 
a category itself and the doctrinal mechanisms that govern it – 
as it did with defamation in New York Times v. Sullivan – the 
Court shows appropriate sensitivity to the First Amendment 
interests at stake.  The Court acknowledges that identifying 
the category is just the first step.  The mere existence of an 
excepted category is not an excuse for black or white 
constitutional adjudication, nor for refusing to sort through 
confusion and inconsistency at the Circuit Court level.  Rather 
than a blunt instrument that removes large swaths of speech 
from protection without regard to the subtle distinctions within 
that category, principled categorical tailoring responds to the 
unique nature of the excepted category, minimizing the harm 
to free expression while preserving the important 
governmental tools essential to prevent intolerable harms.  A 
well-functioning categorical approach performs this function 
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not on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis, but according to a 
preemptive tailoring of the category at issue.  Consistency and 
predictability is established by a robust body of precedent that 
forms a clear set of rules for that category, and the Supreme 
Court, due to its position at the top of the American judicial 
hierarchy, is the one body with the capability to do this in a 
uniform fashion.  
 
The Choice of Categorical Non-Definition: Elonis v. 
United States 
 
Unfortunately, the Court’s courage in taking on the 
nuanced doctrinal work of parsing an important categorical 
free speech exception in Sullivan stands in stark contrast with 
last year’s Elonis v. United States.  The case was a highly-
anticipated opportunity to, at last, put some meat on the bones 
of the sparsely defined true threats category; it was also closely 
watched by scholars and the mainstream press because it was 
the Court’s “first examination of the limits of free speech on 
social media.”176 
At issue was a federal law making the interstate 
transmission of “any communication containing any threat” 
criminal.177  The law was applied to the lurid Facebook 
postings of a self-described aspiring rap musician, directed at 
his estranged wife and others.178  Lyrics posted “included 
graphically violent language and imagery . . . often 
interspersed with disclaimers that the lyrics were ‘fictitious,’ 
with no intentional ‘resemblance to real persons.’”179  Some 
examples of the ominous messages include: “Fold up your 
[protection-from-abuse order] and put it in your pocket . . . Is it 
thick enough to stop a bullet?[,]”180 “I’m not going to rest until 
your body is a mess, soaked in blood and dying from all the 
 
176.  Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Case Tests the Limits of Free Speech 
on Facebook and Other Social Media, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/supreme-court-case-tests-the-
limits-of-free-speech-on-facebook-and-other-social-
media/2014/11/23/9e54dbd8-6f67-11e4-ad12-3734c461eab6_story.html. 
177.  Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2002.  
178.  Id. at 2004-06. 
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180.  Id. at 2006. 
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little cuts[,]”181 and “[e]nough elementary schools in a ten mile 
radius to initiate the most heinous school shooting ever 
imagined [a]nd hell hath no fury like a crazy man in a 
Kindergarten class.”182  The defendant described the postings 
as “therapeutic”183 and argued that “[a]rt is about pushing 
limits.”184 Elonis was nonetheless convicted.185 The Third 
Circuit rejected the defendant’s contention that, under the 
First Amendment, a speaker must intend to communicate a 
threat.186  It instead agreed with the lower court that a mere 
intent to express a message that would objectively be 
understood as a threat would suffice – a reasonable person 
test.187 
The Supreme Court did not agree with the courts below.  
However, it studiously avoided the First Amendment issue, 
instead opting to decide the case on statutory grounds.188  And 
even as a statutory decision, the Court strove to be as 
parsimonious as possible, holding merely that, here, negligence 
was not sufficient for criminal liability, but going no further.189  
The statute was silent as to mental state, but the Court 
reasoned that criminal culpability has traditionally been 
understood to include some element of conscious wrongdoing.190  
The prerequisite of a guilty mind would thus be read into the 
law. 
This, of course, tells us nothing about whether or not the 
law would have been constitutional had the law explicitly 
included negligent communications in its definition of criminal 
threats.  Nor does it tell us whether it would be constitutional 
to penalize expression that is reckless as to whether or not the 
communication will be interpreted as a threat.  If recklessness 
will not suffice, it also remains unclear whether the threat 
needs to be purposeful or whether mere knowledge of its 
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threatening nature will satisfy First Amendment scrutiny.  
Other unanswered questions about the true threats category 
abound: Would the First Amendment calculus differ if this 
were a mere civil action, rather than a criminal one?  Is the 
type of penalty imposed relevant to the constitutionality of 
laws criminalizing a true threat?  After decades of virtual 
silence in this critical area, Elonis left us with no additional 
insight into how “true threats” are to be treated as a “low 
value” category of content based speech under the First 
Amendment.  According to the Court, it was simply “not 
necessary to consider any First Amendment issues.”191  We are 
left in the dark. 
To Justice Alito – writing in partial dissent – the majority 
was abdicating its duty.  He lamented, “this case is certain to 
cause confusion and serious problems . . . While this Court has 
the luxury of choosing its docket, lower courts and juries are 
not so fortunate.  They must actually decide cases, and this 
means applying a standard.”192  Justice Alito thus proceeds to 
decide what the Court refused to decide.  In doing so, he 
unwittingly exposes just how doctrinally under-theorized and 
woefully neglected the true threats category has been, and 
remains. 
In less than three pages, Justice Alito attempts to resolve 
what is a remarkably consequential question of First 
Amendment law: whether reckless expression of a threat 
constitutes a constitutionally proscribable “true threat.”193  He 
answers in the affirmative.194  Troublingly, he grounds his 
analysis in the unresolved and muddled Chaplinsky reasoning 
discussed above.  Citing just three Supreme Court cases – none 
of which, by the way, upheld a “true threat” conviction – 
Justice Alito recounts the clearly “settled” rule that true 
threats are not protected by the First Amendment.195  He 
explains that “there are good reasons for that rule: True 
threats inflict great harm and have little if any social value.”196 
 
191.  Id. at 2012. 
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However, just under the surface of what might seem like a 
truism is a statement that begs the most vital questions and is 
reflective of the still-pervasive confusion left behind in 
Chaplinsky’s wake.  A threat certainly may “inflict great harm” 
and “have little if any social value,”197 but what if it imposes 
some but not great harm?  What if the threat does have social 
value – such as a violent threat made against a high profile 
politician intended to bring attention to, for example, that 
politician’s indifference to the violence suffered by certain 
segments of the population?  One might object to the method of 
getting the point across, but it would certainly constitute 
political speech – traditionally considered to be among the 
highest value expression.198 
One interpretation then, of Justice Alito’s brief matter-of-
fact assertion as to why true threats are not deserving of 
protection, might be that he is putting forth a speech-protective 
threshold definition for an unprotected “true” threat.  In other 
words, he could be suggesting that all other threats – those 
that do not inflict great harm or have little if any social value – 
are necessarily entitled to full First Amendment protection.  
But if this is his thesis, do both the (great) harm attribute and 
the low value attribute have to be present for a threat to be a 
“true threat,” or will one or the other suffice?  It is unclear.  In 
the alternative, these variables could be said to interact, such 
that to be unprotected by the First Amendment a threat 
imposing extreme harm has a lower threshold to meet when it 
comes to an absence of social value, and vice versa. 
Of course, a court cannot, and should not, be expected to 
suss out all of these nuances in a single fact-specific case.  
Perhaps Justice Alito did not intend his words to constitute a 
definitional test at all. Perhaps he is suggesting that these 
attributes are simply self-evident characteristics of threatening 
speech.  However, it does not take a lofty thought experiment 
to conclude that not all threatening expression is created equal.  
A friend’s threat to retract a dinner invitation may not be 
hyperbole, and may even be mean-spirited, but it is unlikely to 
be harmful enough to constitute unprotected speech.  Not all 
 
197.  Id.  
198.  See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 346 
(1995). 
48https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/1
 2016 CATEGORICAL APPROACH TO FREE SPEECH 49 
threats “inflict,” or even risk inflicting, “great harm.” 
A similar point might be made about the purported low 
value of threats.  Justice Alito attempts to wriggle out of the 
“low value” difficulty by conceding: “It is true that a 
communication containing a threat may include other 
statements that have value and are entitled to protection.  But 
that does not justify constitutional protection for the threat 
itself.”199  This, of course, is a straw man argument.  The true 
First Amendment conundrum is dealing not with the valuable 
nature of other expression that might accompany a threat, but 
with circumstances in which the threat itself has significant 
social value.  Even if we ultimately resolve that the harm 
imposed justifies denying the threat to First Amendment 
protection, courts should be upfront about the expressive costs 
of doing so.  If the Court is honest about the complexities 
involved, and the stakes on all sides, it might incorporate these 
variables into a distinctive “true threats” doctrinal rule, a rule 
that can be applied consistently and predictably rather than on 
an ad hoc basis. 
We need only look to the Court’s defamation jurisprudence 
to see that this goal is realistically attainable.  Instead of 
shying away from the inherent challenges of a categorical 
system for content-based discrimination, with defamation, the 
Court embraced the First Amendment puzzle and incorporated 
significant nuance into its approach.  It attached an array of 
standards to the categorical non-protection of defamatory 
speech, differentiating among expression directed at public 
officials,200 public figures201 and private individuals,202 speech 
containing intentional falsehoods, merely negligent ones203 or 
falsehood where there is no fault at all,204 speech addressing 
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matters of public concern versus private matters,205 and 
penalties that are punitive versus merely compensatory.206  
Granted, it took time for the Court to flesh out these rules.  
And of course, the job is never completely done.  This is the 
nature of a common law system in which courts are tasked 
with resolving specific cases or controversies rather than 
issuing broad policy prescriptions.  It took time for the 
doctrinal rules governing this excepted category of speech to 
take shape – and many would argue that the resolution was 
not perfect.  But the Court wisely appreciated its important 
obligation to concretize this excepted First Amendment 
category.  This is quite a contrast with the true threats 
category. 
 
Reinvent the Wheel?  Well . . . yes 
 
One response might be to suggest a somewhat simple 
solution.  Rather than fretting about the Court’s unwillingness 
to adequately operationalize particular categories of 
unprotected speech, why not simply utilize one of the templates 
already devised?  With some categories – whether it be 
commercial speech, obscenity, incitement, or defamation – the 
Court has indeed articulated detailed definitional tests and 
nuanced doctrinal rules for applying a categorical First 
Amendment exclusion.  One commentator, in one of the first 
scholarly law review pieces to address the Elonis (non)decision, 
suggests this very possibility.207 
Michael Pierce, focusing specifically on the online context, 
proposes a rule for the true threats category that would borrow 
the public figure/private figure distinction from the Court’s 
defamation jurisprudence.208  As with defamation, the requisite 
 
a private individual.”). 
205.  Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 
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level of intent for a particular threat to be unprotected would 
depend upon who is targeted by the online threat.209  The 
required mens rea for a non-protected true threat against a 
public figure would be a higher (specific intent) than when the 
threat is aimed at a private individual (recklessness).210  To 
Pierce, the same rationale in the defamation context for this 
two tiered intent standard would justify its use in the setting of 
online threats.211  Namely, “the target’s identity can serve as a 
useful proxy for whether the speech attacking him or her has 
broader significance.”212 
We might rightfully applaud the author’s 
acknowledgement that some threats are bound to have “value” 
as speech, and that such value will vary from statement to 
statement.213  Certainly, threatening language directed at 
public figures may also communicate a message relating to an 
issue of public concern.  If the public figure is also a public 
official with political duties, it may be even more likely that 
punishing such threats will, in some sense, stifle public debate 
and discussion about important issues.  A heightened threshold 
for intent was famously justified in New York Times v. Sullivan 
as a critical speech protective measure because, as the Court 
explained, “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate” 
and it must thus be offered some First Amendment protection 
if free expression is to have necessary “breathing space.”214  
Because of the significant role they play in public life, this need 
for breathing space becomes more important when criticisms 
are directed at public figures.  There is an unmistakable 
tendency to discuss important public issues through the lens of 
such individuals.  One might reasonably agree that breathing 
room for some falsehoods is analogous to breathing room for 
some threatening language used against pubic figures.  In 
other words, the First Amendment protects the occasional 
careless factual error about a public figure the same way it 
should protect the occasional use of inflammatory rhetoric that 
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might sound like a threat to an objective listener. 
However, in other important respects, the public/private 
figure distinction is not a good fit for the true threats category.  
Public figure status of a target is a rather crude proxy for 
threatening speech’s value.  One might argue, as Pierce does,215 
that the voluntary exposure to risk of defamation is quite 
comparable to the voluntary exposure to threats one might 
reasonably anticipate as a public figure.  This may be true.  A 
threat against a public figure certainly may have significant 
social value as expression, and it may, perhaps, be more likely, 
on average, to have such value than threats made against 
private individuals.  But that does not make the analogy to 
defamation a well-tailored fit for First Amendment purposes.  
In sharp contrast with defamatory speech, there is no reason to 
assume that there is a correlation in any particular case 
between the target of a threat and that threat’s social value. 
The Court famously concluded in R.A.V. v. St. Paul that 
even within an unprotected category of speech, discriminatory 
distinctions that prohibit some, but not all, speech are not 
permissible unless they directly relate the very reason the 
category is proscribable.216  This logic fits quite well with the 
Court’s modified test for defamation of public figures; it makes 
distinctions that relate directly to the reason why defamation is 
an unprotected category in the first place.217  Public figures, by 
definition, possess a reputation that is a matter of public 
concern.  Reputation is central to the life of a public figure in a 
way that is qualitatively different than for a private individual.  
The need to actively manage one’s reputation, the expectation 
that one’s affairs will become a matter of public concern, and 
the greater access to the media and other outlets that facilitate 
effective use of counter speech to rebut falsehoods, are all part 
and parcel of the public figure identity.  The doctrinal 
distinction within the defamation category crafted by the Court 
speaks directly to these qualities.  As the Court explained in 
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Gertz v. Robert Welch, public figures voluntarily “have assumed 
roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society . . . [and] 
thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public 
controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues 
involved.”218  Public figures and private individuals are quite 
simply not similarly situated with regard to the harm imposed 
by the expressive category, nor to the speech value of the 
expression. 
In contrast, increased likelihood of being threatened is 
merely associated with public figure status.  This is not unlike 
the way other qualities might make one more susceptible to 
being a target of a threat such as wealth, power, a violent 
temperament or a sharp tongue.  Yet, there is little apparent 
reason to believe that these attributes, like public figure status, 
should result in a differential First Amendment standard for 
determining whether someone else’s speech should be protected.  
A threat imposes a fundamentally different kind of harm than 
defamation.  A threat is aimed directly at a target. Indeed, the 
harm imposed by a threat is, by definition, only harmful when 
the threatening idea reaches the consciousness of the target.  
The words themselves place the target in a state of fear of an 
impending concrete physical or psychological injury and may be 
coercive.  Defamation, in contrast, imposes a harm on the 
target by disseminating false ideas into the greater 
marketplace.  Defamation wrongly diminishes or distorts the 
perception others have of the target.  The harmful ideas do not 
need to reach the target for the injury to occur.  If we take a 
close look at the doctrinal standard established by the Court for 
the defamation category, we see that it was thoughtfully 
tailored to the nature of the particular harm imposed by 
defamatory speech.  True threats are in need of their own 
similarly fine-tuned test and definition. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The goal of this article is not to propose a new model 
framework for the doctrinal mechanics of the true threats 
exception to the First Amendment.  Ultimately it is up to the 
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courts to establish this blueprint, to promote clarity, to further 
First Amendment values while keeping in mind the 
unfortunate truth that free speech cannot be absolute.  This is 
the Court’s job.  With great doctrinal choice comes great 
doctrinal responsibility.  We have seen how the Court made one 
such choice: the categorical model itself was one way of 
addressing an intractable problem built into the First 
Amendment.  As with much Constitutional interpretation, the 
process of refining and rationalizing a particular doctrinal 
choice takes time.  We have seen how the case that first laid 
the groundwork for the categorical approach, Chaplinsky v. 
New Hampshire, was riddled with ambiguity, leaving many 
questions and uncertainties for the future.  This article has 
examined how many of these uncertainties stubbornly persist, 
with members of the Court and top scholars alike still in 
disagreement as to both how the categorical approach should 
function and the basis on which particular categories should be 
identified. 
For the foreseeable future, the categorical approach is here 
to stay.  But a categorical system, without adequately defined 
and systematized categories, is no system at all.  It is arguably 
much less protective than ad hoc balancing, for it establishes a 
default rule that a particular category of speech is unprotected.  
Without defining that category with precision, or establishing a 
nuanced test that is tailored to the particular harms and 
expressive interests unique to that speech category, the Court 
invites blunt speech-suppressive legislation, uncertainty by 
speakers whose expression might be chilled, and inconsistency 
in the courts below.  The First Amendment, as written, offers 
no guidance as to how exceptions should be made to 
comfortably coexist with its absolutist language.  We have seen 
how well the categorical model can work when adequately 
fleshed out, as a fair and predicable doctrinal rule.  There is 
every reason to expect the Court to aspire for such clarity 
wherever gaps in the categorical system exist. 
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